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The Legality of Nuclear Arms Under
International Law*
David M. Corwin**
I. Introduction
Since World War II, the view of some military leaders towards
the use of nuclear weapons has changed dramatically. Previously, it
was accepted as a given fact that any use of nuclear weapons was an
unthinkable proposition. This view has been replaced in the minds of
many by a notion that a limited nuclear war is both feasible and
winnable. This mentality raises a fundamental question: whether any
use of nuclear weapons could receive the imprimatur of international
law?
Although there is no international convention that explicitly
prohibits all uses of nuclear weapons, the effects of all weapons are
governed by numerous conventions and customary international law.
A determination that nuclear weapons would violate one or more
principles of humanity, as embodied in positive or customary inter-
national law, may not be dispositive. When a nation has used a
weapon releasing any gaseous substance or has violated the territori-
ality of a neutral state, that nation has per se violated international
law. Several violations of international law, however, including the
prohibition against causing unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate
harm as between combatants and noncombatants can be excused by
the doctrines of military necessity, reprisal, or self defense when the
use of nuclear weapons is proportionate to the harm caused.
This Article will examine different uses of nuclear weapons and
will assess the legality of these uses under positive and customary
international law. It will conclude that any nuclear weapon would be
encompassed by the prohibition against gas and other related weap-
ons. In addition, it will conclude that in all but its most limited uses,
weapons would cause unnecessary suffering, would fail to discrimi-
nate between combatants and noncombatants, and would violate the
territoriality of neutrals. Even when defenses to violations of interna-
* This article is dedicated to the memory of my father, Profesor Lawrence M. Corwin.
** Associate with Rogers & Wells, New York, N.Y., B.A. 1983 Columbia University,
J.D. 1987 Georgetown University Law Center.
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
tional law are available, this Article will demonstrate that the reali-
ties associated with the use of nuclear weapons necessitate the con-
clusion that any military benefit conferred by such use is inherently
disproportionate to the harms caused by any use of nuclear weapons
and, therefore, that any use of nuclear weapons is illegal under inter-
national law.
II. Applicable Law
The initial inquiry in evaluating the legality of any use of nu-
clear arms is to determine the appropriate body of law. The Charter
of the United Nations counsels that the relevant sources of interna-
tional law are international conventions, international custom, gen-
eral principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and scholarly
writings. Unfortunately, there exists no treaty or convention that ex-
plicitly addresses the legality of all uses of nuclear weapons.' Those
who argue that international law is inapplicable to any issue of nu-
clear weapons point to this lack of a comprehensive treaty provision
as an indication that the use of nuclear arms is not strictly forbidden
by international law. In support of this contention, adherents of this
position cite The Lotus Case,2 an early decision of the World Court.
The Lotus Case held, essentially, that a nation is legally permitted to
take any action that is not strictly proscribed under the rules of in-
ternational law.3 Since no treaty expressly prohibits all uses of nu-
clear weapons, 4 these scholars argue that use of nuclear weapons
cannot be deemed illegal under international law.6
The lack of an explicit treaty provision does not warrant the
conclusion that international law is impotent with regard to nuclear
arms. First, although no convention states that all uses of nuclear
weapons are per se illegal, many agreements have addressed the in-
1. Statute of the International Court of Justice (entered into force in 1945) art. 38.
Several treaties do exist that limit the use of nuclear weapons. For example, various Conven-
tions have outlawed the use of nuclear weapons in Antarctica, Latin America, earth orbit,
outer space, and on celestial bodies. See Feinrider, International Law as Law of the Land:
Another Constitutional Constraint on Use of Nuclear Weapons, 7 NOVA L.J. 103, 113, citing
the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (ratified presently
by twenty-six states); the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 (ratified presently by twenty-four states); 1967 Treaty on Princi-
ples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S 205 (rati-
fied presently by eighty-one states).
2. The Lotus Case, cited in Falk, Meyerowitz and Sanderson, Nuclear Weapons and
International Law, 20 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 541, 558 (1980).
3. This holding is based on the theory that any restriction on the actions of a country
must be based on the express or implied consent of that country. Falk, Nuclear Weapons,
supra note 2, at 558.
4. Id. at 541.
5. Interestingly, the Geneva Convention of 1949 is silent regarding the use of nuclear
weapons. O'Brien, Some Problems of the Law of War in Limited Nuclear Warfare, 14 MIL. L.
REv. 1, 16 (1961).
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evitable consequences and effects that would stem from any use of
nuclear weapons. Any argument that a convention that antedates the
advent of nuclear weapons or does not specifically refer to nuclear
weapons did not intend to restrict the use of nuclear weapons and,
therefore, may not be interpreted in such a manner, is untenable.
When a nation has violated the provisions of a treaty, the treaty has
been broken regardless of the source of that infringement unless a
provision in the treaty excepts violations from a particular source. In
addition, it is precisely the lack of a convention explicitly treating
the nuclear weapon issue that necessitates extrapolation of existing
treaties to cover situations involving nuclear weapons.6 That interna-
tional law permits indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons is neither
contended nor would such a result be practically feasible in today's
society.
Second, the Statute of the International Court of Justice de-
mands recourse to customary international law." Although the term
"customary international law" is an amorphous and somewhat intan-
gible term, evidence of its dictates can be found in statements of
international bodies representing the views of individual countries
and in unilateral actions by single countries. Determining the "cus-
tomary international law" regarding nuclear weapons requires the
evaluation of judicial precedent and nonbinding resolutions by the
United Nations General Assembly.
III. Principles of Humanity
Given the fact that the use of nuclear weapons is nowhere ex-
pressly prohibited by international accord, the next inquiry is
whether exploding a nuclear weapon would violate the dictates of a
convention that does not specifically address the nuclear issue. In de-
termining whether or not a nation's conduct violates an international
agreement, the action in question must be viewed against the literal
terms of the document. The legality of an action depends solely upon
whether or not the action contravenes the terms of a given
agreement.
A. Unnecessary Suffering
The international concept of humanity requires combatants to
minimize the degree of suffering and destruction caused to opposing
forces. The origins of this principle date back to the Declaration of
St. Petersburg in 1868. The Declaration was enacted to restrict the
6. Fried, The Nuclear Collision Course: Can International Law Be of Help, 14 DEN. J,
INT'L L. & POL'Y 97, 100 (1985).
7. See supra note 1.
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use of a new kind of bullet that caused painful wounds that were
difficult to treat. 8 This convention was the first document to recog-
nize a limitation on the means available to accomplish military
ends,9 stating that combatants may not use weapons to "uselessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men."' 10 The principles enunci-
ated in the Declaration of St. Petersburg were reiterated and ex-
panded upon in the Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Con-
vention of 1907. The Regulations reaffirmed that the right of
belligerents to adopt means to injure the enemy was not unlimited"
and that "treacherous killing' 2 and causing "unnecessary suffer-
ing"'3 was impermissible.
The standard used to determine whether or not the use of a
particular weapon constitutes unnecessary suffering has never been
authoritatively set forth. The inherently pliable term "unnecessary"
can be given several meanings. The most common standard of "un-
necessary suffering" balances the harm caused by the weapon
against the necessity of the military goals sought to be achieved.' 4
One formulation of this test states that the legality of the use of a
particular weapon hinges upon the "needlessness, the superfluity, the
disproportionality of harm relative to the military result" as opposed
to the degree of destruction and human suffering.' 5 Another com-
mentator, while paying lip service to the balancing process noted
above, places greater weight on the total and indiscriminate nature
of the weapons to determine whether the suffering was
unnecessary.' 6
An argument can be made that the use of nuclear weapons does
not violate either standard. A nation can point to the necessity of a
8. Falk, Nuclear Weapons, supra note 2, at 560.
9. Id. at 559.
10. St. Petersburg Declaration, 1868, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. 95-96 (Supp. 1907).
The Declaration provides as follows: "[T]he only legitimate object which states should en-
deavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military force of the enemy; for this purpose
it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men, or render their death inevitable
.
.Id.
II. The Hague Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, 1907,
art. 22 (annex), 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (effective Feb. 28, 1910) [hereinafter Hague
Convention].
12. Id. art. 23(b).
13. Id. art. 23(e). The Hague Convention specifically states as follows: "[lit is especially
forbidden: . . .(b) to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or
army . . .(e) to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffer-
ing." These principles were updated and inserted in the Geneva Conventions of 1949. See
Fried, supra note 6, at 100.
14. For a more complete analysis of the proportionality theory, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 46-49.
15. Weston, Nuclear Weapons Versus International Law: A Contextual Reassessment,
28 McGILL L.J. 542, 554 (1983); see also Mallison, The Laws of War and Limited Wars, 36
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 308, 323 (1967). Mallison states that the suffering must be considered
"in relation to the military advantage to be derived from the use of the weapon." Id.
16. See Falk, Nuclear Weapons, supra note 2, at 561.
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particular usage of nuclear arms using traditional national defense
and national security justifications. Although the credibility that can
be attached to such a justification obviously depends upon the fac-
tual situation involved, the great elasticity of this standard suggests
that this defense would be invoked as a matter of course, no matter
what degree of destruction was wrought upon a particular
population.
Justification of the use of nuclear arms under the "indiscrimi-
nate suffering" formulation of unnecessary suffering is more difficult.
Most frequently, theoreticians posit that nuclear weapons can con-
ceivably be used in such a manner so as to avoid massive and indis-
criminate destruction. This hypothetical usage would be aimed at a
limited military target, involve a comparably small weapon and
would be fused so as to limit the amount of radioactive fallout. By
dint of a cautious and surgical use of nuclear weapons, made possi-
ble by technological advancements, it is believed that nuclear weap-
ons could be employed in a way that would be legally indistinguish-
able from conventional weaponry.1"
There are numerous adherents to the position that the use of
nuclear arms, in most if not all instances, would cause unnecessary
suffering. One commentator did not use either definition of unneces-
sary suffering, regarding as axiomatic the proposition that nuclear
bombs would cause unnecessary suffering. More frequently, com-
mentators claim nuclear weapons contravene the Declaration of St.
Petersburg and the Hague Convention under the more traditional
notions of unnecessary suffering.18 Though some concede that it is
theoretically feasible that a nuclear weapon could be employed with-
out violating this rule,19 the vast majority of possible uses would
cause a disproportionate degree of destruction and suffering.
Any weapon that is exploded in the vicinity of a civilian popula-
tion would cause casualties that are incidental to the military goals
sought by such use. Even the smallest of nuclear arms would be in-
herently incapable of avoiding destruction unnecessary to the mili-
tary goal. In addition, the long-lasting effect of radioactive fallout
from nuclear weapons on the immediate victims and their offspring
are certainly unnecessary to any military objective. Finally, in the
event of a nuclear attack, victims would be in a heavily contami-
nated area. Thus, adequate medical care and treatment would be
impossible, causing additional suffering that would be termed "un-
necessary" under any definition of the word. The position that al-
17. See, e.g., Comment, The United States' Nuclear First Strike Position: A Legal Ap-
praisal of its Ramifications, CAL. W.L. REv. 508, 524 (1977).
18. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 6, at 100.
19. Falk, Nuclear Weapons, supra note 2, at 561.
Spring 1987]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
most all uses of nuclear arms would violate the prohibition against
inflicting unnecessary suffering has been summarized as follows:
If [the rule of unnecessary suffering] was applied, nuclear weap-
ons and strategy would seem clearly illegal under international
law because their manifest effect almost certainly causes unnec-
essary and excessive human suffering, an extreme instance of
adapting a means of warfare, contrary to Article 22, whose
character is unlimited. Given the area of total and indiscrimi-
nate destruction resulting from the use of nuclear weapons and
the residual genetic effect of radioactive fallout, it would be im-
possible to conclude that the use of nuclear weapons involves
only the limited application of proportionate force required to
weaken an enemy.20
B. Gas
A second argument that a use of nuclear weapons would violate
the principles of humanity involves the Geneva Gas Protocol of
1925.21 The Protocol accepts the universal recognition that the use in
war of poisonous or other gases and all other related substances are
illegal under international law. The traditional defenses available
under international law are not available to those nations who violate
this principle; the prohibition against using such weapons is absolute.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union are parties to this con-
vention, as are a large number of other states.22 Because of the great
degree of compliance with the Protocol and its broad terminology,
the Protocol has become, "without doubt declaratory of the custom-
ary law,' 28 and hence is binding on even nonsignatory nations.
The broad phraseology of the Protocol renders it susceptible to
many interpretations. Proponents of the view that atomic weapons
are not within the purview of the Geneva Gas Protocol claim that to
20. Id.
21. Protocol Prohibiting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter Geneva
Gas Protocol]. The convention states in pertinent part as follows:
The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, in the name of their respective
Governments:
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all
analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the gen-
eral opinion of the civilized world ....
To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of
International Law, binding alike the conscience and practice of nations;
Declare:
That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to
Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohi-
bition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as
between themselves according to the terms of this declaration.
22. See Weston, supra note 15, at 560.
23. Brownlie, Some Legal Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 14 INT. & COMP.
L.Q. 437, 444 (1965).
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compare the weapons that the Protocol was meant to prevent with
revolutionary nuclear weapons is a dubious proposition. The chemi-
cal weapons addressed by the Geneva Gas Protocol have a "general
aspect" that distinguishes them from modern weaponry.24 Second,
from a scientific standpoint, radioactive fallout from nuclear weap-
ons only effects external portions of the body and therefore cannot be
considered poisonous under the meaning of the Protocol.2 5 In addi-
tion, there is support for the position that fallout loses its radioactiv-
ity very rapidly and any harm caused would be negligible. Finally, it
has been argued that these weapons are designed to produce a mini-
mal amount of fallout, with "most" deaths resulting from the
weapon's blast effect.2 6
Despite these arguments, nuclear weapons appear to be covered
by the prohibition contained in the Geneva Gas Protocol. The Argu-
ment that the Protocol does not apply to weapons that were not
within the contemplation of its drafters is countered by the argument
that, when a statute is phrased in general terms, it must be applied
broadly. To restrict its application would be analogous to interpret-
ing older traffic statutes in such a way as to confine the word "vehi-
cle" to the horse and cart.27
Second, the position that nuclear weapons cannot be categorized
as having poisonous effects because they do not cause destructive ef-
fects inside the body has been vigorously disputed. 8 Further, the
broad language of the Protocol, prohibiting "poisonous or other
gases" and other analogous substances, suggests that such a narrow
interpretation of the convention was not intended by its framers.
Thus, one commentator has concluded as follows:
This Protocol is so comprehensive in its prohibition that it would
include any weapon whose effects were similar to that of poison
gas or bacteriological warfare. Because the characteristics of a
weapon determine whether it is prohibited the effects of radioac-
tive contamination would appear to make nuclear weapons ille-
gal regardless of whether radiation is treated as a gas, liquid, or
solid. Here again, a strong case exists for the proposition that
human exposure to radiation or radioactive fallout produces
symptoms and results indistinguishable from the effects of a
poison, and in some respects more seriously, including delayed
disease and genetic distortion. "
24. Id.
25. Bright, Nuclear Weapons as a Lawful Means of Warfare, 30 MIL. L. REv. 1, 19
(1965).
26. See Lee, supra note 17, at 520.
27. See Brownlie, supra note 23, at 444.
28. Lee, supra note 17, at 520.
29. Falk, Nuclear Weapons. supra note 2, at 563.
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Finally, the argument that the effects of radioactive fallout
would be "minimal" or "negligible" is irrelevant. The Protocol out-
laws the use of any substance covered by its terms regardless of the
degree of harm caused. The damage that the weapon would cause is
therefore not an appropriate inquiry in determining whether an actor
has violated the Protocol.
C. Combatant and Noncombatant Distinction
Another principle of humanity that would be endangered by the
use of nuclear weapons is the distinction between combatants and
civilians. It is a well established precept of international law that
noncombatants are immune from enemy attack.30 In 1923, the
Hague Draft Rules on Aerial Warfare stated that only military
targets are permissible, and then only if the raid can be achieved
without indiscriminate bombing of civilians."1 This principle was re-
cently included in the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Combat.32 The United States government,
however, has taken the position that incidental civilian casualties
caused by bombings of military targets are permissible. 33
In support of the U.S. position, it should be noted that the Draft
Rules of Aerial Warfare are not binding. In addition, the countries
with nuclear capacity have not yet ratified the 1977 Protocol, and
the United States and the United Kingdom both signed the Protocol
with the stipulation that it would not apply to nuclear weapons. 4
The Soviet Union had also signed but not ratified the 1977 Geneva
Protocol. 5 Finally, even assuming that a nuclear strike against a
military target near a populated area would be unlawful, there still
remains the theoretical possibility of a limited strike with limited
fallout that would not offend the Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare or
the 1977 Protocol.
In opposition to the view that the Draft Rules and the 1977
Protocol do not constrain the actions of nations, some commentators
have noted that despite the lack of binding force of either conven-
30. See Fried, supra note 6, at 100
31. Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare (1923) art. 24(3).
32. See Geneva Protocol I Additional Relating to the Protection of Victims of Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Geneva Protocol]. The Protocol states as fol-
lows: "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population
and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall di-
rect their operations against military objectives."
33. Dept. of the Air Force, AFP 110-31, International Law: The Conduct of Armed
Conflict and Air Operations 6-5 (1976). The treatise states that "the immunity of the civilian
population does not preclude unavoidable and incidental civilian casualties which may occur
during attacks against military objectives."
34. See Weston, supra note 15, at 566.
35. Id. at 566.
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tion, it is "probable" that both documents reflect the present state of
customary international law.36 If the conventions are declaratory of
customary law, then the provisions are binding despite the parties'
failure to ratify these provisions. With regard to the 1977 Protocol,
international law, as manifested in the Vienna Convention, requires
that countries that have signed but have not ratified an international
agreement must refrain from acts that would defeat the agreement's
object and purpose.3 7 Thus, neither the United Kingdom, the United
States, or the Soviet Union is free to simply ignore the dictates of
the 1977 Protocol.
Although some claim that it is theoretically possible to use nu-
clear weapons so as to avoid indiscriminate harm among casualties,
it is unlikely that such usage would occur in reality. Even assuming
that such a use was feasible, it is uncontested that the vast majority
of nuclear strikes would violate this principle.
D. Inviolability of the Territoriality of Neutrals
The use of nuclear weapons would also intrude upon the terri-
tory of nonparticipating states. International law has long recognized
two related principles: first, that belligerent countries may not extend
the field of combat onto the territory of a neutral party, and second,
that neutral states have a right to exclude belligerents who enter
their territory.38 The prohibition against violating a neutral state's
territoriality is absolute; it cannot be excused by invoking any of the
traditional defenses available under international law. A logical ex-
tension of these rules suggests that customary international law
would support the position that "the use of nuclear weapons in cir-
cumstances in which the user knows that it is bound to injure neutral
states, must be considered as a violation of international law and, if
it involves the killing of innocent neutrals, a clear war crime."3 9 The
Hague Convention embodied these principles within its text, stating
as follows: "The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable."4 °
Because of the size and the immense destructive powers of nu-
clear weapons, proponents of their legality must argue that nuclear
technology has advanced to a stage at which a nuclear strike could
be confined to a limited region and would not transgress upon the
territorial boundaries of neutrals. Even assuming such an attack
would be possible, however, international law would prohibit any nu-
clear strike that was not confined to the territories of the conflicting
36. See, e.g., Falk, Nuclear Weapons, supra note 2; Weston, supra note 15, at 566-67.
37. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 289.
38. Id. at 559.
39. N. SINGH, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 106 (1981).
40. Hague Convention, supra note II, art. I.
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parties. The Hague Convention is phrased in general and mandatory
terms; no invasion of a neutral's territory is permissible. Thus, only
the most limited potential uses of nuclear weapons are even theoreti-
cally lawful, and the vast majority of potential uses clearly would
violate customary international law and the Hague Convention.4'
IV. Defenses
The conclusion that a nuclear strike violates some aspect of in-
ternational law is not necessarily determinative. Even when interna-
tional law has been violated, a nation can be excused for its actions
if the actions are justified under one of the defenses recognized by
international law. These defenses, however, are not universally avail-
able. When a nation has violated the prohibitions against gas weap-
onry or the territoriality of a neutral state, the actions are illegal,
regardless of any justification. When an action results in unnecessary
suffering or fails to discriminate between combatants and noncomba-
tants, these defenses are considered in determining the legality of the
action.
A. Military Necessity and Proportionality
Perhaps the most frequently invoked defense is that of military
necessity. Military necessity has been defined as the "necessity of
those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of war,
and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of
law."' 42 Governments have often seized this concept and tried to ex-
empt their nation from legal sanctions by claiming that their actions
were required by the necessities of the country's military situation.
The doctrine of military necessity, however, is by no means un-
limited. It is universally recognized that international law places
constraints on military necessity. The mere presence of a military
objective does not in itself permit unlimited destruction. During the
Nuremberg war trials, a United States Military Tribunal rejected
the defendants' military necessity defense for acts committed in an
41. This Article does not provide an exhaustive list of the arguments that a nuclear
strike would violate the principles of humanities as recognized under international law. For
example, the 1977 Geneva Protocol prohibits weapons or tactics that would cause long-term
and widespread damage to the natural environment. 1977 Geneva Protocol, supra note 32, art.
35(3). Without doubt, widespread or even limited usage of nuclear weapons would violate the
terms of the Protocol. In addition, article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter states that the exter-
mination of a population, in whole or in part, is a crime against humanity. See Falk, Nuclear
Weapons, supra note 2, at 566. It would seem that a nuclear strike against any area inhabited
by civilians would contravene the dictates of the Charter.
42. U.S. Dept. of War, General Order No. 100, Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field, art. 17 (April 24, 1863), reprinted in Ragone, 16
INT. L. & POL. 701, 702 (1984).
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occupied territory. 43 The court held as follows: "the destruction of
property to be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessi-
ties of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of interna-
tional law. There must be some reasonable connection between the
destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy forces." 44
The extent to which international law places limitations on the
doctrine of military necessity is subject to debate. Several commen-
tators have suggested that if an action violates a rule of international
law, the doctrine of military necessity will not excuse the act.45 This
restriction on military necessity, however, seems overbroad. It is un-
likely that any military campaign that a country would be able to
completely avoid contravention of international law. For example, al-
though conventional bombardment of a city may violate certain prin-
ciples of humanity, it has been sanctioned by the international legal
community. Conventional bombings, like a nuclear strike, undoubt-
edly cause casualties on an indiscriminate basis. A strong argument
can also be made that some of the suffering caused by such tactics is
unnecessary. Since conventional bombings have achieved widespread
acceptance and use, it appears that although a particular action may
be violative of some aspect of international law, this factor is not
dispositive.
A more useful concept for evaluating the lawfulness of wartime
conduct under the military necessity doctrine is the principle of pro-
portionality. Proportionality is the fundamental concept that bal-
ances the legitimacy of military ends against the means used to
achieve these ends."6 Under this test, as one commentator has sug-
gested, the relevant inquiry is not whether a particular weapon vio-
lates international law but instead whether the destruction caused by
a weapon is proportionate to a legitimate military objective.47
The concept of proportionality provides a useful framework for
evaluating the lawfulness of all military tactics. Regarding the wide-
spread acceptance of a conventional bombardment on a defended
city that attempted to destroy legitimate military targets, it is appar-
ent that the degree to which the principles of humanity are violated
43. See United States v. List, I I Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Mili-
tary Tribunals Under Control Law No. 10, 757, 1253-54 (1947).
44. Id.
45. See Paust, The Nuclear Decision in World War II - Truman's Ending and Avoid-
ance of War, 8 INT'L LAW. 160, 172 (1974); see also U.S. Dep't of the Army, Field Manual
No. 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (1956) [hereinafter Army Field Manual], which states
that "[m]ilitary necessity has been generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the
customary and conventional laws of war inasmuch as the latter have been developed and
framed with consideration for the concept of military necessity."
46. See, e.g., O'Brien, supra note 5, at 7.
47. Id.; see also Army Field Manual, supra note 45, which offers the following formula-
tion of the concept of proportionality: "loss of life and damage to property must not be out of
proportion to the military advantage to be gained."
Spring 1987]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
is relatively small compared to a legitimate military objective. If a
belligerent were to employ the tactic of saturation bombing a civilian
area with conventional bombs, the likelihood that such actions would
be deemed illegal under the proportionality test would increase. The
use of nuclear weapons is obviously even more difficult to justify
under this standard.
The legal consequences of some uses of nuclear weapons are
easier to evaluate than others. It would be difficult to find support for
the notion that the annihilation of a large city, predominantly inhab-
ited by civilians, would be lawful, notwithstanding other military
objectives. Conversely, other theoreticians envision a situation in
which a single nuclear warhead, fused to limit fallout, is used against
a legitimate military target in an area where there are no noncomba-
tants. This, they argue, would be a lawful use of nuclear weapons. 8
Within the infinite range of possible scenarios that may lead to
the use of nuclear weapons, many exist which defy simple categori-
zation. Herein lies the greatest flaw with the proportionality test.
Like any balancing test, the final determination is based in a highly
subjective interpretation of the data. Absent a numerical standard
with which to judge the relative importance of violations of humani-
tarian concerns and military needs, the final determination of
whether conduct is legal or illegal under international law will vary
greatly. The practical consequence of such a flexible standard is that
a nation can always claim that its use of nuclear arms is proportion-
ate to the end it seeks to achieve.4 9 Thus, although proportionality
provides a helpful guide to judging the legality of instances in which
nuclear weapons are used, it is potentially a source of abuse.
In the hands of other nations and international legal scholars,
proportionality can be an equally effective tool to condemn any use
of nuclear weapons. In all but its most limited uses, nuclear weapons
possess a destructive capacity exponentially greater than conven-
tional bombs. Necessarily, an attack on a single target by a nuclear
weapon would cause a proportionally greater degree of destruction to
people, property and the environment than would its conventional
counterpart. In addition, the element of radioactive fallout gives
these weapons an inhumane quality that contravenes several princi-
ples of international law. The cumulative effect of these destructive
properties lead to the conclusion that, except in very limited circum-
stances, no degree of military necessity would justify using nuclear
48. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 17, at 524-25.
49. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States are a perfect
illustration of this problem. The United States endeavored to exempt its conduct from interna-
tional condemnation by invoking the principle of military necessity. See infra notes 67-76 and
accompanying text.
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weaponry.
B. Reprisals and Self-Defense
A second doctrine that may excuse a use of nuclear weapons
that would otherwise be unlawful is reprisal. Reprisals have been de-
fined as "actions which are in themselves unlawful, but which be-
come lawful when taken in response to unlawful actions by the other
side." 50 Lawful reprisals, however, are limited to actions that are
proportionate to their antecedent provocation.5" In other words, the
harm caused by a retaliatory attack must be in proportion to the
original attack. The purpose of permitting retaliatory actions is to
deter the aggressor from future transgressions by informing the ag-
gressor that any attack will be met by an equally destructive
response.
52
There are two possible sets of circumstances that could lead to
the use of nuclear weapons as an act of reprisal: a conventional at-
tack and a nuclear attack. It is difficult to conceive of a nuclear re-
prisal that would be proportionate to a conventional attack. The vast
capacity for destruction possessed by nuclear weapons far exceeds
the damage that can be caused by conventional means, and it is
therefore unlikely that this defense would be accepted by the inter-
national community under these circumstances.
The use of nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear strike
would, at first glance, fare much better in the eyes of international
law, provided that the response was proportionate in scope to the
original attack. The United Nations Charter, however, in articles
2(4) and 51, condemn forcible reprisals. Article 2(4) forbids a nation
from threatening or using force against another state. Article 51 pro-
vides an exception to the general rule provided in Article 2(4), but it
is limited to actions taken in self-defense. Since the purpose of repri-
sals is not to defend but to retaliate, article 51 does not cover such
actions.
Even greater legal problems are encountered in analyzing the
scope of the related doctrine of self-defense. Self-defense differs from
reprisal in that its objective is not to deter future attacks by the en-
50. See Fried, supra note 6, at 113. An often quoted decision, rendered by an arbitration
panel in 1928, defined reprisal as "an act of self-help ... corresponding after an unsatisfied
demand to an act contrary to the law of nations . . . .They would be illegal if a preliminary
act contrary to the law of nations had not furnished a reason for them .... ." See R.
HENCKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW, p. 889 (1980). In addition, the decision states that the use of
force could only be justified by necessity. Id. For purposes of analysis of the legality of nuclear
weapons, Fried's definition is more useful. The arbitration panel's requirement of an "unsatis-
fied demand" is unrealistic, given the very limited time within which a country may respond to
the information that it is the target of a nuclear strike by a belligerent country.
51. See, e.g., 1977 Geneva Protocol, supra note 32, art. 20, 51, 53, 55.
52. See Fried, supra note 6, at 113.
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emy, but to prevent harm to a country's territory and its inhabitants.
Customary international law places significant limitations on when
self-defense can be invoked. Generally, self-defense is restricted to
instances in which the need for self-defense is "instant, overwhelm-
ing, and leaves no choice of means, and no moment for delibera-
tion.""s In addition, any action taken in self-defense is, like reprisal,
limited by the concept of proportionality.5 4 The United Nations
Charter also recognizes the right of self-defense when a nation is the
object of an armed attack."
The interpretation of these general principles, however, can vary
greatly. The analysis of the legality of nuclear weapons used in self-
defense revolved principally upon three scenarios. The first hypothe-
sis would occur when a nation had been attacked with conventional
weapons. The proportionality principle mandates that the force used,
even in a defensive posture, must be proportional to the quantum of
force used by the aggressor.56 Because of the vast disparity in magni-
tude between any nuclear weapons and any conventional means of
warfare, it is difficult to conceive of a proportionate nuclear defense
to a conventional attack. 57
The second scenario involves a nuclear response to an actual nu-
clear attack. This situation presents the strongest case for permitting
a nuclear strike in some capacity. Still, it is difficult to ascertain
what degree of response is appropriate. The doctrine of self-defense
is applicable only to prevent further damage to citizens and territo-
ries. The right to self-defense does not include the right to an armed
attack for retaliatory purposes; that is the domain of the reprisal de-
fense. Any attack on the civilian population would be unlawful, since
it would not further a "defensive" objective. Defending against the
53. See R. Henckin, supra note 50, at 890 (quoting Letter from Mr. Webster, U.S. Sec.
of State to Lord Ashburton, British Minister (Aug. 6, 1842)). The correspondence was in
response to the massacre of thirty-three Americans by a group of armed British citizens. Web-
ster claimed that the circumstances permitting self-defense "were not present in that issue."
54. See Kennedy, A Critique of United States' Nuclear Deterrence Theory, 9 BROOK-
LYN J. INT'L L. 35 (1983).
55. U.N. Charter, art. 51. The article states as follows:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Counsel has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Secur-
ity Counsel under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
56. See Falk, Nuclear Weapons, supra note 2, at 567-58.
57. For support for the proposition that nuclear weapons are an inherently dispropor-
tionate means of defense against a conventional attack, see Kennedy, supra note 54, at 10; see
also 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 492-93 (1971); but see Falk, Nuclear
Weapons, supra note 2, at 568. It should be noted, however, that even if the self-defense
argument is unsuccessful, an aggressor nation can alternatively pursue either reprisal or mili-
tary necessity as a defense.
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threat of additional nuclear attack could only be achieved by a
counterforce strike against the aggressor's available nuclear weap-
ons. Either military strategy would result in a violation of interna-
tional law: a full scale assault on all of the aggressor's nuclear forces
would doubtless result in incalculable destruction and would there-
fore be disproportionate to all but an all-out assault; a more limited
counterforce strike would not achieve the objective of self-defense; to
eliminate the aggressor's nuclear forces and, hence, to prevent the
aggressor from inflicting additional damage. Therein lies the flaw
with nuclear responses in self-defense to a nuclear attack: the degree
of force needed to effectively defend against future attacks is inher-
ently disproportionate to the destruction that it would necessarily
cause, particularly given the fact that there is no guarantee that the
aggressor would launch additional weapons.
The third scenario contemplates anticipatory self-defense or the
use of nuclear weapons in order to prevent an imminent attack. Arti-
cle 51 of the United Nations Charter restricts the use of force in
self-defense to reactions against armed attack.58 Several commenta-
tors have proffered reasons why Article 51 should be interpreted to
sanction anticipatory self-defense. First, it is argued that the defini-
tion of an armed attack must be altered to take account of the ad-
vent of nuclear weapons.69 Because of the enormous potential for de-
struction caused by one or more nuclear weapons, it is imperative
that such an attack be prevented if it is, in fact, imminent. A second
argument is based on the traditional assumptions underlying the
right of self-defense. The concept of self-defense has always been
predicated on the notion that an attacked country will be able to
respond to the attack of the aggressor. With the development of nu-
clear weapons, this assumption no longer holds true. For self-defense
to retain its effectiveness, the argument concludes, Article 51 must
be interpreted to allow a proportionate armed strike in anticipatory
self-defense.60
Despite the above arguments, article 51 by its terms limits the
right of self-defense to instances of armed attack. In addition,
equally strong policy arguments support the thesis that the advent of
nuclear weapons necessitates the limitation of the right of self-de-
fense. First, the massive potential for destruction of nuclear weapons
renders it even more important that the nations involved not initiate
the use of nuclear weapons. Any doctrine that purports to broaden a
58. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
59. United States Memorandum No. 3, July 17, 1946. International Control of Atomic
Energy: Growth of a Policy, Dept. of State Pub. 2702 (1946).
60. W. FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 259-60
(1964).
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nation's right to first use should therefore be avoided. Second, any
unilateral determination that it is the imminent target of a nuclear
attack may be based on unreliable or inaccurate information. Third,
it would be unwise to offer a nation an opportunity to employ nu-
clear weapons using self-defense as a pretext for outright aggression.
Since there is no uniformly accepted standard as to when a
threatened attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant a preemptive
strike, a nation intending to employ nuclear weapons could adopt a
broad view of anticipatory self-defense to justify its future conduct.
C. Other Considerations in Applying the Proportionality Test
In each of the three hypotheticals presented above, a complete
evaluation of the harms caused as a result of a nuclear assault must
go further than a theoretical calculation of the casualties suffered
and the property damaged in an ideal attack. To accurately assess
whether a nuclear strike is proportional, consideration must be given
to other factors. Perhaps the most important concern of nuclear
weapons, particularly a first use of nuclear weapons, is a "Pandora's
Box" concept; that is, the idea that once nuclear weapons are used,
escalation and incalculable destruction would inevitably result. A
large number of commentators have expressed the sentiment that it
is unrealistic to expect military superpowers to restrain their use of
nuclear weapons."i The theory that parties to a nuclear war would
be able to contain its use appears even more implausible upon reali-
zation that it is highly unlikely that either side would permit itself to
be placed at a decided military disadvantage as a result of a nuclear
attack. As one commentator wryly noted, it is unlikely that the two
nuclear combatants would be able to restrict themselves "as if some-
how governed by the rules of the Marquess of Queensbury."' 2
A second consideration is the predictability of nuclear weapons.
Since modern nuclear weapons have never been used under actual
combat conditions, it is not unlikely that in a nuclear bombardment
a weapon would not be delivered with ideal precision. 3 The likeli-
hood of misguided weapons increases with the number of weapons
employed in a nuclear attack. In addition, the unpredictability of
weather and wind conditions could exacerbate the effects of a nu-
clear strike. Radioactive fallout can be carried hundreds of miles by
air currents; a sudden change in these conditions could have un-
61. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 6, at 110 (unrealistic to expect a superpower nuclear war
to remain limited); Kennedy, supra note 54, at 61 (escalation inevitable after first nuclear
weapon used); Lee, supra note 17, at 580 (first use would virtually guarantee retaliation).
62. See Weston, supra note 15, at 58 1. In addition, the inherent fragility of communica-
tions between countries would make it unlikely that any conciliatory communications would be
possible after an initial nuclear exchange. See Kennedy, supra note 54, at 61-62.
63. See Weston, supra note 15, at 581.
[Vol. 5:2
LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR ARMS
predicted and devastating effects, most notably on neutral states.
Another element that must be considered in determining the
proportionality of a nuclear attack is the incalculable effects of radi-
oactive fallout. It is self-evident that in a major nuclear war, the
effects of fallout would harm millions in present and future genera-
tions. 4 In Nagasaki, where only one atomic bomb was dropped, peo-
ple are still experiencing the effects of genetic damage.15 The wide-
spread and far-reaching effects of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
bombings underscore the fact that even a small dose of radiation can
induce harmful mutations.66
These factors must all be considered in determining whether a
particular use of nuclear weapons survives the proportionality test.
The cumulative effect of these considerations point to the conclusion
that any use of nuclear arms, no matter how limited, would contra-
vene international law.
V. Other Sources of Evidence for Determining Customary Interna-
tional Law
Since the advent of nuclear weapons in the 1940s, various
sources of international law have provided some evidence as to
whether the use of these weapons is against customary international
law. Perhaps the most useful sources of evidence are the interna-
tional conventions discussed above. Another important source for de-
termining customary international law is international judicial prece-
dent. There has been only one instance in which a tribunal has
rendered judgment as to the legality of first use of nuclear weapons.
In 1963, the District Court of Tokyo decided The Shimoda Case, in
which it assessed the legality of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki by the United States.6 7 In Shimoda, five Japanese
plaintiffs brought an action against the Japanese government, claim-
ing that the government had violated their constitutional rights by
waiving the rights of its nationals to pursue claims against the
United States government that arose from the bombings." As an
element of their claim, the plaintiffs asserted that the United States
government violated both positive and customary international law
by its use of atomic weapons. 9 The plaintiffs claimed that the bombs
64. See Fried, supra note 6, at 102.
65. See Ragone, supra note 42, at 708.
66. Id.
67. Tokyo District Court, No. 2914 of 1955 and No. 4177 of 1957, Civil Affairs, 24th
Department, Dec. 7, 1963, translated and reprinted in JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INT'L L. 212
(1964).
68. Falk, The Shimoda Case: A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks Upon Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 759, 763-64 (1965).
69. Id. at 761.
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caused indiscriminate and unnecessary suffering, constituted a poi-
sonous gas, and failed to distinguish between combatants and non-
combatants, all in violation of various international agreements. The
court, while holding that the plaintiffs had no legal basis for recover-
ing damages from the Japanese government, agreed with plaintiffs'
contention that the atomic bombings contravened international
law.70
The court's opinion focused not on the general issue of the legal-
ity of atomic weapons, but instead on whether the particular bomb-
ings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States violated inter-
national law. 7' Although the court noted that a new weapon is legal
until prohibited by international law, it averred that an international
convention need not be direct or express to be applicable.72 The court
then examined the present state of international law and concluded
that the weapon employed by the United States was within the pe-
numbra of earlier prohibitions.7 - Specifically, the court upheld the
plaintiffs' claim that the bombings did not discriminate between mil-
itary and nonmilitary objectives 7 4 caused unnecessary suffering, vio-
lated prohibitions against poison gas, 5 and was not justified by mili-
tary necessity. 6
The United Nations General Assembly has provided an addi-
tional source of evidence as to the state of customary international
law. Since its inception, the General Assembly has endeavored to
reach a common ground between nations as to the legality of the use
of nuclear weapons.77 Despite early difficulty in creating a unified
position, the international legal community gradually recognized a
need to prevent proliferation of atomic weapons. In response to this
sentiment, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1653(XIV), an
unequivocal statement condemning the use of nuclear and thermonu-
clear weapons.78 The Resolution was passed by a vote of fifty-five to
twenty, with twenty-six abstentions. 79 The Resolution itself declared
"[tjhat the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is contrary to
the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a di-
70. Id. at 759.
71. Id. at 769.
72. Id. at 771.
73. Id. at 770 n. 22. The plaintiffs invoked, inter alia, the Declaration of St. Petersburg,
the Hague Convention of 1907, and the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925. See Falk, Nuclear
Weapons, supra note 2, at 775.
74. Falk, supra note 68, at 773.
75. Id. at 775.
76. Id.
77. Falk, Nuclear Weapons, supra note 2, at 575. The General Assembly created the
Commission of Atomic Energy in 1946 in an attempt to reach an international agreement with
regard to atomic weapons.
78. G.A. Res. 1653, 16 U.N. GAOR Sup. (No. 17) 4, U.N. Doc. A/5116 (1961) [here-
inafter Resolution or U.N. Resolution].
79. See Brownlie, supra note 23, at 438.
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rect violation of the United Nations Charter .. .."80 The Resolu-
tion also specifically stated that the use of nuclear and thermonu-
clear weapons "is contrary to the rules of international law and to
the laws of humanity." 81
Commentators have expressed differing views as to the signifi-
cance of the Shimoda case and U.N. Resolution 1653. The signifi-
cance of Shimoda is limited by three factors. First, the part of the
opinion devoted to the issue of whether the use of the atomic weap-
ons by the United States was not essential to the holding of the case
and was therefore dicta. Second, the court's holding was narrowly
circumscribed and did not extend beyond the factual situation in-
volved. Third, the court rendering the opinion was under the sover-
eignty of the country that was the target of the weapon.82
Despite the existence of factors tending to diminish the import
of Shimoda, other factors strengthen its potential as valuable prece-
dent. The opinion was a thorough and apparently impartial analysis
of the issue presented. The appearance of impartiality is further sup-
.ported by the court's reliance on several well-qualified experts in in-
ternational law. In addition, since Shimoda is the only case address-
ing the legality of a use of nuclear arms, in the absence of more
authoritative standards, it provides an initial model for handling
such a matter. Finally, it should be noted that the true importance of
Shimoda lies not in its strength as binding judicial precedent, but as
a possible basis or building block that may contribute to the creation
of a more uniform worldwide view of the legality of nuclear weap-
ons. It is this potential universal condemnation that may act as a
powerful deterrent to future use of nuclear arms.88 Such condemna-
tion may, in time, undermine internal support for policies that es-
pouse the threat or use of nuclear arms and render such policies po-
litically unfeasible.
The principal drawback with the U.N. Resolution is that it
lacks binding force. One commentators has opined that a consensus
among a majority of member states in the United Nations is not
declaratory of customary international law unless such a custom has
actually been established." Nevertheless, a strong argument can be
made that the absence of any use of a nuclear weapon since the
United States bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki suggest that
such a policy has become "customary." Even conceding this point,
however, the fact that fifty-five countries supported the position that
80. U.N. Resolution, supra note 78.
81. Id. The Resolution cited the indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind as
support for this conclusion. Id.
82. See Lee, supra note 17, at 523.
83. See Falk, supra note 68, at 782.
84. See Bright, supra note 25, at 28-29.
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any use of nuclear weapons is unlawful certainly presents cogent evi-
dence as to the present state of customary international law. Like
the Shimoda decision, perhaps the most significant aspect of the
Resolution is its contribution towards establishing a uniform vision
in the international community that any use of nuclear weapons is
inconsistent with international law.8 5
VI. Conclusion
Despite the lack of a binding international convention specifi-
cally outlawing the use of any nuclear weapon, many strong argu-
ment exist that any such use would be contrary to positive and cus-
tomary international law. In all but its most limited uses, nuclear
weapons could certainly violate one or more of the principles of hu-
manity. The determination that one or more of these principles have
been offended does not necessarily warrant the conclusion that the
use of all nuclear weapons are prohibited under international law.
For most violations, a country may exempt itself from a determina-
tion that its conduct was unlawful by successfully invoking the de-
fenses of military necessity, reprisal, or self-defense. The success of
these defenses rests on a determination that the degree of the viola-
tions is proportionate to the military objective sought to be achieved.
These defenses, however, are not available to all violations of
international law. When a country has employed a weapon releasing
poisonous or other gases and where a country has violated the terri-
torial rights of a neutral state, these offenses constitute a per se vio-
lation of international law. The broad language of the Gas Protocol
indicates that its terms should be extrapolated to cover the radiation
present in nuclear weapons. The vast majority of potential uses of
nuclear weapons would interfere with the territoriality of other coun-
tries. Even with a limited use of a nuclear weapon, there is no guar-
antee that adverse weather conditions or technological error would
not result in a violation of a neutral country's territorial right. These
two prohibitions warrant the conclusion that any use of nuclear
weapons would violate positive international law.
Despite the availability of various defenses to excuse a nuclear
strike, it is difficult to envision a situation in which the harm caused
85. This aspect of the Resolution's significance was summarized by Falk, Meyerowitz
and Sanderson:
As evidenced by the actions of the General Assembly over the years, it is
clear that a legal consensus has been emerging which considers the use and pos-
session of nuclear weapons to contradict the fundamental humanitarian princi-
ples upon which the international law of war was erected . . . . In sum, [the
Resolution] inherently realize[s] that global survivability is so elemental to the
international law of war that a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons can be
reasonably inferred.
Falk, Nuclear Weapons, supra note 2, at 578.
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in such an attack would be proportionate to the military objective.
Again, the vast majority of conceivable uses, particularly attacks on
civilian centers and responses to conventional attacks, would not
meet the proportionality test. Even when a nuclear strike has been
employed so as to minimize the concomitant destruction and suffer-
ing, it is still unlikely to survive the proportionality test. An accurate
calculation using the proportionality test must consider all the reali-
ties that are inherently associated with the use of nuclear weapons,
including the following: the likelihood that the use of a nuclear
weapon will commence a spiral of escalation, the possibility that lack
of control over nature and the weapons themselves may cause un-
foreseen damage, and the probable failure, when reprisal or self-de-
fense is claimed, of nuclear weapons to achieve the purposes that
make such defenses permissible. The combination of these many fac-
tors renders it unlikely that any use of nuclear weapons would pass a
test of proportionality.
The Shimoda decision and the General Assembly Resolution
1653 reenforce the claim that any use of nuclear arms violates both
positive and customary international law. Although neither source is
binding on the international community, their import goes beyond
the mere opinion that the use of nuclear arms is illegal. While
neither Shimoda nor the Resolution are necessarily declaratory of
international law, they provide evidence that the emerging consensus
in the international community is that the catastrophic consequences
of a nuclear war are not tolerable, regardless of the justification.
These sentiments support the contention that no use of nuclear arms
would receive the imprimatur of international law; and instead, it
would be soundly condemned.
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